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to condemn an Israeli attack on Hamas operatives in Gaza.25 Similarly, despite
pressuring Turkey to crack down on Chechen terrorists, it has failed to put the
anti-Turkish PKK terrorist organization on its official terrorist list.26 Finally the
Russian effort in July 2005, as part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
to have the US expelled from its bases in Central Asia, even as the Taliban were
stepping up their attacks in Afghanistan cannot be considered the act of a genuine
partner in the anti-terrorist effort.26
The height of Russian hypocrisy over terrorism, however, was to come in
2006. Following the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January 2006
which were to result in a victory for Hamas a development which Putin called a
very serious blow to American diplomacy in the Middle East the diplomatic
Quartet (the US, UN, EU and Russia) met to deal with the new situation. The
Quartet decided not to provide any assistance to a Hamas government unless it
renounced terrorism, recognized Israel s right to exist, and respected international
agreements for an Arab Israel peace settlement, such as the Oslo Accords and
the Quartet s Road Map. Almost immediately thereafter, however, Putin invited
a Hamas delegation to Moscow, proclaiming that Hamas was not on the Russian
Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 129
terrorist list, and hence not considered a terrorist organization a clear change
from Russian policy in 2000 when Sergei Ivanov, then head of Russia s Security
Council, had stated to a visiting Israeli delegation that what they were facing in
Gaza and the West Bank (the Hamas-led Al-Aksa Intifada) was exactly what
Russia was battling in Chechnya.28
When the Hamas delegation came to Moscow in early March, Putin had a
number of objectives. First, by inviting Hamas, he associated Russia with the
Arab consensus which was to give Hamas time to change its policies, but in
the meanwhile to work with a Hamas government and not to sanction it. Such a
position not only enabled Russia to pursue an independent position in the Middle
East, it also enabled the Arab world to play Moscow against Washington and
Europe, and Russia was widely praised in the Arab world for the invitation.
Another goal of Putin was to get Hamas to downplay the Chechen issue, and the
Hamas delegation complied, with delegation leader Khaled Mashal stating after
meeting with Lavrov, that the Checken separatists were an internal problem of
Russia. 29 This drew a bitter reaction from the Chechen rebels, who called Hamas
decision to visit Putin s Russia, which had killed so many Chechen Muslims, not
only regrettable but also un-Islamic. 30
For its part, the Hamas delegation, which refused while in Moscow to compromise
over its refusal to recognize Israel, was coming to Russia primarily in search of
international legitimacy. Indeed, Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri said, on the
eve of the visit, Now Hamas is on the threshold of international legitimacy, thanks
to the visit by Hamas leaders to Moscow. 31 Further legitimizing Hamas during the
visit was its visit with the Russian Mufti Council chairman (besides discussions,
they also prayed together) and the Russian Patriarch. It was clear that Putin used
the Hamas visit to Moscow to improve the position of Russia in the Middle East
at the expense of the United States. He also used the visit of an avowedly Islamic
organization to de-legitimize the Islamic nature of the Chechen rebellion, even as
he was legitimizing Hamas role in Middle East diplomacy.
In sum, given Putin s speech at the OIC in 2003, his policy toward Hamas and
the PKK, and his efforts to terminate US bases in Central Asia, Moscow cannot be
seen as a genuine partner in the war on terrorism.
Russia s relations with Iraq
Prior to the Anglo-American attack on March 2003, which overthrew the regime
of Saddam Hussein, Putin had two central goals in Iraq. The first was to obtain the
more than $8 billion dollars owed to Russia by Iraq. The second was to support
the development of major Russian business ties with Iraq, especially Moscow s
oil companies. Such deals, however (other than oil-for-food purchases which were
quite profitable for Moscow), could only take place when UN sanctions against Iraq
were lifted. Consequently Moscow energetically pushed for the lifting of sanctions
until the war broke out.
Nonetheless as the US moved inexorably closer to war in 2002, Putin faced a
clear dilemma how to maintain good relations with the US while at the same
130 R.O. Freedman
time protecting Russia s extensive business interests in Iraq and its hopes for future
contracts there. As the crisis deepened, however, Putin saw some benefits flowing
to Russia. Oil prices, on which Russia depended for more than one-third of its tax
revenues, shot up from $25 per barrel to an average $38 per barrel, giving Russia
an economic windfall. Under the circumstances, the Russian leader adopted a dual
strategy. First, he sought to prevent the war by calling for the UN Security Council
to legitimize any decision to go to war. Second, he sought to prolong the crisis as
long as possible so as to keep the extra income flowing to the Russian economy.
This, in turn, would keep Russian growth rates high, would enable Moscow to
pay off some of its international debts (thus enhancing its international investment
climate), and would provide enough extra spending power to get Putin not only
through the Duma elections in December 2003 but also through the presidential
election in the Spring of 2004.
At the same time Moscow sought to maintain contact with the United States, as
well as with both the Saddam Hussein regime (his advisor Yevgeny Primakov was
sent to Baghdad) and, discretely, with the Iraqi opposition so that no matter who
emerged on top in Iraq, Russia would continue to have access to Iraqi oil. Saddam
Hussein, however, was less than happy with Moscow s policy and, in December
2002, canceled the lucrative contract Lukoil had received to develop the West
Qurna oil field, although he left the contracts with Machinoimport and Zarubezhneft
in place. Nonetheless, by also floating the possibility of up to $40 billion in new
trade deals, he sought to entice Putin to give him greater support.32
Interestingly enough, as the war approached, US Russian relations did not
immediately suffer. In part this was due to the fact that the leading forces opposing
a US British attack on Iraq were the French and Germans, and this provided
diplomatic cover for Moscow, and in part it was due to the fact that the US kept
hoping for Russian support, or at least neutrality, during the war, hinting that it
would in return respect Russia s economic interests in Iraq. Nonetheless, once
Putin publicly sided with French leader Jacques Chirac, US Russian ties began to
deteriorate.33 The situation was to worsen once the war broke out in late March.
Putin, while not being forced to veto a resolution calling for UN Security Council
support of the war, because the US decided not to seek such a UN resolution,
nonetheless spoke out sharply against the British US attack, calling it the most
serious crisis since the end of the cold war, and asserting that it was a direct
violation of international law, and a major political mistake that could cause the
International Security system to collapse. 34 Russian American relations were
further hurt by credible reports that Russia had secretly sold military equipment
to Iraq, including night-vision goggles, anti-tank missiles, and devices to interfere
with US GPS positioning systems.35 In addition, the Russian ambassador to Iraq
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